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Time and Space in Social Theory
Anthony Giddens
In recent years, there have been fundamental changes in social theory, particularly
in the English Speaking world. For many years, sociology was dominated by a
series of assumptions which one could label ,the orthodox consensus'. The ortho¬
dox consensus expressed the dominance of leading trends in American sociology
over sociological thinking in Britain. The orthodox consensus, in which writers such
as Talcott Parsons, R.K. Merton, S.M. Lipset and others were the major luminaries,
can be characterised as follows. On the phüosophical side, naturalism: that is to say,
in the orthodox consensus it was held, in various versions, that sociology shares a
broadly simüar epistemological framework with the natural sciences. Many writers
(not Parsons) adopted en bloc logical positivist modeis of science elaborated by
such authors as Carnap, Hempel and Nagel. On the methodological side, func-
tionalism: those in the orthodox consensus believed that, of aü the natural sciences,
sociology Stands in dosest proximity to biology, and hence that ,structural-func-
tional' explanations of the kind favoured in macro-biology should constitute the
core of sociological explanation. In respect of social change, evolutionism. I know
that for some whüe evolutionary thought was placed under a cloud by functionalist
thinkers. In the nineteenth Century, however, Spencer and Durkheim had demons-
trated that there can be a close association between functionalism and evolutionism,
and in due course this was given recognition by Parsons, who developed his own
evolutionary theories. But I would say that evolutionism was never in fact lost. It
was there, in a more surreptitious but very important fashion, in the prevalence of
dichotomous modeis of change. As everyone knows Parsons made Tönnies's distinc¬
tion between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft the basis of his pattern variables. But
evolutionism was especiaUy pronounced in .modernisation' theory, which most of
the above writers accepted in some version or another. This was in turn associated
with a fourth, and final, trait I want to pick out about the orthodox consensus: the
theory of industrial society. By the ,theory of industrial society', I mean the notion
that industrialism is the principal transformative force in modern history; that
industrialism has generally simüar consequences for whatever society that exper-
iences it; and that Marxism is dead, i.e., that class confhct no longer plays a signifi-
cant role in the contemporary world.1
The orthodox consensus, which reigned from roughly the early fifties to the
early seventies, of course never went unchaUenged. Various elements of it were
strongly attacked by Marxist writers, and by those who attempted to Substitute
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,confüct theories' for what they saw as an over-concentration — especially by Par¬
sons and his followers — upon consensus in society. Those who advocated different
conceptions of sociology altogether — for example, writers like Schutz in exile in
the USA, or Winch in Britain, both of whom advocated the significance of strong
ties between plülosophy and sociology; or like Eüas in exüe in Britain, or Bendix in
the USA, who proposed comparative and .historical' forms of sociology - these
went largely unheard.
The decade of the seventies has seen the passing of the orthodox consensus.
What was once a consensus has been disowned by almost everybody, including
some of its favourite sons. The results are well-known: a fragmentation of social
theory into a variety of competing schools, the rise of novel frameworks, such as
ethnomethodology, and a massive resurgence of Marxist thought. For a whüe it
seemed as though social theory would remain a kaleidoscope of fragmented particles
— as though, once the orthodox consensus had been exploded, nothing would hold
together any longer, and even dialogue between the varying types of social theory
was impossible. We can now, I think see this as a passing phase. Major efforts at the
reconstruction of social theory have already been made, and with some consider-
able success. I have tried to play a part in these developments in two recent books.
One is called, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, New Rules of Sociological Method; the
other, Central Problems in Social Theory.2 It is not my aim to create a new ortho-
doxy to Substitute for the old one; on the other hand, I do think that each of the
four themes of the erstwhüe orthodox consensus which I mentioned above have to
be placed seriously in question. But it is not enough that the ideas of the orthodox
consensus should be quietly forgotten: we have to see just what is defensible, and
what must be abandoned, in them.
This raises a whole host of questions. In the English Speaking world, the first and
fourth theme have received most attention. There have been a spate of attacks upon
naturaüsm and positivism — in which numerous authors have looked to German and
French traditions of thought which a decade ago were vütuaUy unknown in the
United States and Britain. Thus .hermeneutics' has only recently become a famiüar
word to us, and for the first time Lacan, Foucault and Derrida are influential in
Anglo-Saxon social thought. Many of us are already pretty fed up with phüosophi-
cal critiques of positivism, and without denying their importance, as I am a culprit
in this regard, I shall not discuss such issues here. Neither shaU I discuss the fourth
theme, the theory of industrial society, at least not in a düect way, although some
of what I have to say later does bear upon it. In my opinion there are still some
very fundamental issues here that are today being debated in a significant way. I
have tried to explore some of these in a book, The Class Structure of the Advanced
Societies,3 but shall not raise them in this context.
In what I have to say in this paper, then, I shaU be concerned with a critical
analysis of the other two themes of the orthodox consensus: functionalism and
evolutionism. I want to advance Claims for a view of sociology which is both non-
functionalist and non-evolutionary. Now to raise the question of functionahsm is
almost enough to put everyone immediately to sleep. For has not functionalism
been the subject of one of the most protracted and boring debates known to socio¬
logy?4 Might not the same be said of Systems theory, sometimes thought to be
closely alüed to functionaüsm? To a certain degree, I am prepared to grant these
things — especially the sommambulent qualities of the functionahsm debate of
some fifteen to twenty years ago. What I cannot accept is that the problems raised
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by functionaüst authors can be quietly forgotten. For one thing, to my mind any-
way, is certain: that this debate resolved hardly any of the issues central to the
question of the relevance of functionalism to sociology. Nor are they resolved by
appeals to information theory or Systems theory - even if this is undeniably far
more sophisticated than sociological functionahsm ever was. I beheve that at least
some of what I want to argue applies as forcibly to Professor Luhmann's ,func-
tional-structurahsm' as to American ,structural-functionahsm'. Professor Luhmann
is stül prepared to talk of functionahsm. There are many, however, who declare
themselves roundly to be ,non-functionalists', and who wül have nothing to do with
the term. But it is not hard to show that theü writings are riddled with functionahst
assumptions, often of a very crude kind — I have in mind here particularly the
works of the so-caUed ,structuralist Marxists' who have sought to apply the views of
Althusser to contemporary sociology and anthropology.
My argument wül be as follows. The term ,function', I shaU say, is of no use in
sociology: indeed, it would do no härm at all to ban it altogether as any sort of
technical term in the social sciences. Most of those who have attacked functionahsm,
in any interesting way, have on the other hand relapsed into subjectivism. Like
those influenced by ordinary language phüosophy, or by varieties by phenomeno-
logy, they have seen functionalism as a deterministic type of thought, and have
attempted to replace it with one which gives primacy to the intending, reasoning
agent. In so doing, however, they have moved away precisely from that area where
functionahsm was strongest: the analysis of institutions, of large-scale social pro¬
cesses. In moving away from functionalism, we need to be able to recognize both
what I shall caü the theorem of .knowledgeabüity' — that all of us are purposeful,
knowledgeable agents, who have reasons for our actions; and that social processes
at the same time work ,behind our backs', and affect what we do in ways of which
we are unaware. Marx summed this up long ago in the famous aphorism, ,Men make
history, but not in cücumstances of their own choosing'. But I do not beheve that
there is any Single school of thought which has managed to speU out the implica-
tions of this seemingly banal Statement successfully.
.Functionalism' means many things, but I shall define it as that type of doctrine
which holds that (a) societies, or social Systems, have ,needs'; and (b) that the
identification of the ways in which they meet these needs constitutes an explana¬
tion of why particular, given social processes are as they are. This characterisation
includes both ,normative functionalism' (Parsons) and ,confhct functionahsm' (Mer¬
ton) as well as the various covert functionahsms of Althusser et al.
I shall object to functionaüsm on several grounds: (a) that (like structuraüsm) it
rests upon a false division between statics and dynamics, or between the synchronic
and the diachronic; (b) that, in stressing system needs, functionahst authors have
been unable to see human beings as reasoning agents, who know a great deal about
what they are doing in the course of day to day life; (c) that Systems have no needs,
except in a sense which is very different from that which functionahst authors
beüeve; (d) that therefore to identify system needs is not to explain anything at aU;
that there is not anything that counts as .functionahst explanation'.
I shall analyse these fairly rapidly, but all the points I shaU make can be unfolded
in much greater detail, and have a number of very important impücations for social
theory.
(a) The question of the division of the synchronic and the diachronic for the
first occasion begins to get us near the title of my paper: time and space in social
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theory. One of the most general underlying notions in all my arguments is that time-
space relations have to be bought into the very heart of social theory, in ways in which
they have not been previously. Rather than addressing this directly, it is a supposition
on which many of the elements of my various arguments in this paper depend. I shall
not attempt to document the various differing views that functionahst authors have
had on the differentiation of synchrony and diachrony. I shaU assert rather dogmati-
cally that this differentiation is logically rather than contingently, associated with
functionalism. And I shaU claim that it is a division which should be abandoned once
and for aU. The characteristic view of the synchronic/diachronic distinction is that,
to study a social system synchronically is to take a sort of ,timeless snapshot' of it.
By abstracting from time, we can identify functional relations; when we study Systems
diachronically, we analyse how they change over time. But the result of this is an
elementary, although crucial error: time becomes identified with social change. The
identification of time and change has as its obverse the assimüation of ,timelessness'
and stabiüty: the notion that synchronic analysis aüows us to determine the sources
of social stabüity, whüe diachronic analysis is needed to understand the sources of
change in social Systems. The elementary error in this is that time is obviously as
logically necessary a component of social stabiüty as it is of change. A stable social
order is one in which there is close simüarity between how things are now and how
they used to be in the past. This shows how misleading it is to suppose that one can
take a .timeless snapshot' of a social System, revealing its structure, as one can, say,
take a real snapshot of the architecture of a buüding. For social Systems only have
structural properties in and through their .functioning' over time: the .patterning' of
social relations is inseparable from their continual reproduction across time.
(b) My second objection can be stated as implying that functionahst theories
have lacked adequate accounts of human action, in the sense in which much recent
philosophy has been preoccupied with that term. I think that this judgement
appües to Parsons as much as to anyone eise, in spite of the fact that he labelled his
theory ,the action frame of reference'. This is a complicated issue, but basicaUy I
think it is true to say that human agents appear in Parsons's scheme (as in that of
Althusser) as what Garfinkel calls ,cultural dopes'; not as actors who know a great
deal (discursively and tacitly) about the institutions they produce and reproduce in
and through theü actions. Contrast Parsons or Merton with Goffman. Why do Goff-
man's works have an intuitive appeal for those who have not met with much socio¬
logical writing before, whüe those of authors such as Parsons or Merton (I beheve)
do not? This is not simply the result of Goffman's own writing skül, however signi-
ficant it may be. It is because Goffman treats human beings as sküled and knowl-
edgeable agents, who employ their knowledgeabihty routinely in the production
and reproduction of social encounters. There is a strong phenomenological com¬
ponent in this, which in my opinion is of central importance in social theory. Goff¬
man shows us many of the things we ,know' about social Conventions or institu¬
tions, and which we must know for theü reproduction, but which we know in a
tacit rather than an exphcit sense. They become clear to us only when he points
them out, but nevertheless we do already know them: and very dazzhng and subtle
these tacit forms of knowledge turn out to be, however much we ordinarily take
them for granted as members of any given society. Functionahsts, by contrast, dis-
count agents' reasons in favour of .society's reasons': a true sociological explanation
gets .behind the backs' of social actiors themselves. (Reasons, it might be emphasis-
ed, are not at aU well analysed as ,manifest functions'.)5
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For the sake of brevity, let me merge (c) and (d) together. Social Systems have
no needs — nor even do they have any .functional exigencies'. Now there have been
functionalists (e.g., Mahnowski) who have held that only individuals have needs,
not social Systems. But most functionalists have attributed needs, or .requirements',
to social Systems, and have believed these have an integral explanatory role in
understanding these social Systems. But social Systems do not have needs, at least in
the sense that individual actors do. Let us consider a concrete iUustration, Marx's
discussion of the reserve army in the capitaüst economy. Marx's argument can be
read, and frequently has been read, in a functionahst vein. Capitaüsm has its own
,needs', which the System functions to fulfil. Since the System needs a reserve army,
one comes into being. The argument is sometimes stated in reverse. Since the
Operation of capitahsm leads to the formation of a reserve army, this must be
because it needs one. Neither version of the reserve army argument can be defended.
Not even the most deeply sedimented institutional features of societies come about
because those societies need them to do so. They come about historically, as a
result of concrete conditions that have in every case to be düectly analysed; the
same holds for their persistence.
There is only one logical format in which talk of ,system needs' is viable, but it
does not involve attributing empirical needs to social Systems. This format, on the
contrary, is one of counter-factual argument. We can quite legitimately pose con-
jectural questions such as: ,What would have to be the case for social system X to
come about, or persist, or be transformed?' But we have to be very careful with
such propositions, because they readüy lend themselves to Interpretation in a func¬
tionahst mode. Take as an example the Statement: ,in order to persist in a relatively
stable form, the capitaüst economy has to maintain a certain overall level of profit'.
The force of ,has to' here is counter-factual: it involves identifying conditions that
must be met if certain consequences are to obtain. The ,has to' is not a property or
,need' of the System.
In my recent writings I have proposed that functionahsm should be replaced by
what I call a theory of structuration. I consider that such a theory meets the
criterion I mentioned before, of dispensing with the concept of .function', and with
the notion of ,functional explanation'. It does so, however, without sacrificing the
interests of functionaüsts in institutions, and in long-term, large-scale social pro¬
cesses. I shaU not attempt to describe this theory in detail here, but merely indicate
its outünes in the briefest fashion, because it connects through to what I have to
say about evolution. According to the theory of structuration, aU social action
consists of social practices, situated in time-space, and organised in a sküled and
knowledgeable fashion by human agents. But human knowledgeabihty is always
,bounded' — by unacknowledged conditions of action on the one side, and un¬
intended consequences of action on the other. A crucial move in this theory is an
attempt to transcend the Opposition between ,action' theories and .institutional'
theories mentioned above. This move is accomplished by the concept of what I call
the duality of structure. By the duality of structure, I mean that the structured
properties of social Systems are simultaneously the medium and outcome of social
acts. One way to Ulustrate this idea is by taking example from language. The
structural properties of language, as qualities of a Community of language Speakers
(e.g., syntactical rules) are drawnuponby a Speaker in the production of a sentence.
But the very act of speaking that sentence contributes to the reproduction of those
syntactical rules as enduring properties of the language. The concept of the duality
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of structure, I beheve, is basic to any account of social reproduction, and has no
functionahst overtones at aU.6
This returns us to the theme of time. According to the theory of structuration,
there are three intersecting levels of time involved in every moment of social
reproduction; each is also a contingent feature of social reproduction. First, there
is the temporaüty of immediate experience, the continuous flow of day-to-day hfe:
what Schutz, following Bergson, caUs the duree of activity. Second, there is the
temporaüty of Dasein, the life-cycle of the organism. Thüd, there is what Braudel
calls the longue duree of institutional time: the long-term Sedimentation or develop¬
ment of social institutions. It is essential to see that each of these interpenetrate,
and that, according to the theorem of the duahty of structure, every moment of
social interaction imphes the longue duree of institutional time. The most trivial
exchange of words imphcates the Speakers in the long-term history of the language
in which those words are formed, and at the same time in the continuing reproduc¬
tion of that language. This is very important. For most theories in sociology which
have had strong phenomenological overtones, which have focussed on the knowledge-
abiüty of social actors, have had at best a truncated time-sense. They have reorganis-
ed the Schutzean durie, but not that of Braudel. In the theory of structuration, I
am exphcitly concerned with rejecting the idea that either form of duree has logical
primacy over the other. Hence it is necessary to elaborate an account of the longue
durie of institutional time, and this brings me to the second theme of the erstwhüe
orthodox consensus, the theme of evolution. Just as I argued for a wholly non-
functionaüst sociology, so I also want to make a radical rejection of all forms of
evolutionary ideas that, in my view, have had a particularly noxious influence in
sociology.
Evolutionary theory, of course, is also about time, in a two-fold sense — the
elapsing of time in the longue duree, and writing about time in the sense of the
Interpretation of history. In the orthodox consensus, there was a prevalent view of
the relation between sociology and history which demarcated them rather clearly.
Sociology, it was believed by many, is about the discovery of laws or generalisa-
tions that have the same logical Status as laws in the natural sciences. Such laws
therefore abstract from time and place, and within limiting conditions apply to all
historial periods. History is about the .content' which can be organised in terms of
such laws: the historian provides the ,raw material' that the sociologist generalises.
Such a conception is only tenable within a positivist epistemology, and with the
demise of positivism can easily be seen to be fundamentally defective. Its residues
continue to be feit, however, and there is no shortage of authors who would wish to
sustain the existence of some sort of fairly clearcut distinctions between sociology
and history. I do not believe that any such distinctions exist. In saying this, I mean
more than to advocate some sort of ,historical sociology', which would have a dis-
tinctive field of investigation of its own. I mean to say that there simply are no
distinctions between history and sociology. The theorem of the duahty of structure,
it seems to me, serves as a basic organising principle for social science as a whole. I
do not intend by this to say that there are no sociological laws or generahsations.
But sociological laws, in my view, do not have an identical logical form to those of
the natural sciences, if we continue to presume that the latter have a universal
character.7 That is to say, they are themselves historical; the causal relations they
embody are in principle mutable in the üght of human knowledgeabüity, including
within this the sorts of knowledgeabüity generated by sociologists.
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In the heyday of the orthodox consensus, any kind of analysis of long-term
institutional processes, as I have commented before, was unpopulär. Functionahsm
severed itself of from evolutionary theories, and the conception of sociological laws
mentioned above meant that few sociologists immersed themselves in matters of
historical detaü. (All of this is no doubt less true in Germany than in the Anglo-
Saxon world.) Following Parsons's lead, however, there has been a strong revival of
interest in evolutionary theory. Moreover, conceptions of evolution have achieved
a revival of interest in anthropology, whüe in archaeological theory they remain
dominant. Finally, and by no means least important, we should remind ourselves
that an evolutionary theory, in some version or another (and there are various ones)
is basic to Marxism. For Marx's vindication of the triumph of sociahsm depends
upon predicating a progressive dialectical movement from tribal society to a mature
socialist order.
As this üst indicates, there are many kinds of evolutionary theories, and I have
no intention in this context of even attempting to survey or even classify them. I
have, however, carried out an extensive review of conceptions of evolution in socio¬
logy, anthropology and archaeology in another publication.9 The concept of evolu¬
tion, whether posed in .universal', ,unüinear' or .multiünear' form, in vütuaUy all
theories I have examined hinges upon (a) some kind of notion of ,adaptation', in
which (b) adaptation to the material conditions of the environment is given prime
place. ,Adaptation' may be understood in amoreor less mechanical way in different
theories. The most sophisticated Marxist versions, including the particular .recon¬
struction of historical materialism' worked out by Professor Habermas in his theory
of evolution, take ,adaptation' to imply an active mastery by human beings of theü
envüonment, in which there is a mutual interplay between man and nature. Other
Marxist or Marx-inspüed versions, such as that which for such a long whüe enjoyed
a pre-eminent position in archaeological circles, the work of V. Gordon Chüde, have
been of a more mechanical kind.10 Some of the crudest notions of adaptation
appear in functionahst theories of evolution, although one must except Parsons's
account from this evaluation. So faras the bearing of .adaptation' upon the material
world is concerned, there are again numerous different interpretations. In more
orthodox Marxist conceptions, as is very famüiar, the accent is placed upon man's
increasing capacity to expand the forces of production, this process propelüng
human evolution through a series of revolutionary changes. In other schemes, such
as those proposed by Habermas or Parsons, considerable emphasis is placed upon
societal norms and values as the .cybernetic' controUers of material transformations.
But the two points I have indicated both apply to these as to other variants of
evolutionary theory.
Now I want to erase the notion of .adaptation' (or any synonyms) from sociolo¬
gical vocabulary as I want to do with that of .function', but this time on a combina-
tion of theoretical and empirical grounds. So far as the logical grounds are concern¬
ed, the idea of .adaptation' — at least as used by most evolutionary thinkers — if
offered as an explanatory principle of social change, falls into the same category as
the functional ,needs' to which I have already objected. Societies have no need to
,adapt' weü or poorly to their environments. We can posit as a counterfactual the
supposition that every society which has survived over a period of time ,must' have
acquüed enough food, shelter, etc., for its members to have survived. But this is not
an explanatory principle: it merely caUs for one. Now one might then perhaps be
prone to argue that it is not societies as such which ,adapt' to theü envüonment, it
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is precisely theü members that do so, in knowledge of what they are doing and with
the desüe to become as ,materiaUy productive' as they possibly can. It is here that
we have to move to the more empirical side of the argument. It has long been posit-
ed by Marxist authors, and by many non-Marxist ones besides, especiaUy within the
discipline of archaeology, that the drive to mastery of the material envüonment is
the key to major phases of social transformation. But recent archaeological and
anthropological evidence has placed a serious question-mark against this. It has
proved wrong to suppose, as the anthropologist Stanley Diamond has put it, that
there is an .immanent logic' in surplus production: that is to say, that if .primitive'
societies do not produce a .surplus', it is because they cannot
— because the forces
of production are inadequately developed.11 A good case can be made for Sahüns's
view that, at least in many so-caüed .subsistence economies', no principle of mate¬
rial scarcity operates: .Scarcity', he argues, ,is a creation of modern economies
—
and the driving principle of the market-industrial system.'12 Hunting and gathering
societies are not necessarily impoverished: even in relatively harsh envüonments
hunters and gatherers do not typically ,work hard' as compared to a modern indus¬
trial labourer. Much the same Standpoint is expressed by Pierre Clastres, who Claims
to show that members of most .primitive' societies ,have at theü disposal, if they so
desüe, all the time necessary to increase the production of material goods.'13 They
do not so desüe, since the expansion of material production is not experienced as
an impelüng demand.
AU this, I think compromises the very core of at least many evolutionary theo¬
ries. And it does so not just by questioning old dogmas about .adaptation'. It has
a further imphcation that relates back to my discussion in the earlier part of this
paper. In other words, most theories of evolution, like much of sociology when it
was domüiated by the orthodox consensus, either has no place for, or underestimates
the knowledgeabihty of human subjects — in this case, human subjects hving in
relatively .primitive' societies. The transitions from hunting and gathering to agri-
cülture, or from settled agrarian communities to class-divided ,civüisations', have no
inevitabüity about them at aU; neither can we assume that such transitions were
actively sought after by those involved in them. On the contrary, there is plenty of
evidence that, for instance, those in ,primitive' societies have often known a good
deal about supposedly superior .civiüsations', and have actively resisted incorpora-
tion within them. There can be no doubt that the müitary factor has been decisive
here, and indeed that the significance of müitary power in historical transforma-
tions has been vastly underrated by very many areas of social theory, including
those of an evolutionary sort.
If the central mechanism of most evolutionary theories — .adaptation' — is
removed, much of the distinctiveness of evolutionary theory is lost anyway. I have
some sympathy, given this reservation, with what is sometimes caUed .ümited multi-
hnear evolution', but in this there is no need to use the term .evolution' at aü, with
its strong resonance of evolutionary theory in biology. Rather than using such
terminology, I want to suggest an approach to history which understands social
Organisation and transformation in terms of what I shall caU episodic characterisa-
tions and what I shall label time-space edges. ,Episodes' refer to processes of social
change which have a definite düection and form, in which definite structural trans-
formations occur. Episodes would include such transitions as those transforming
settled agrarian commununities into class-divided states — or the reverse process. In
talking of time-space edges I want to emphasise the significance of the simultaneous
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existence of types of society in episodic transitions. If we take an evolutionary view
of history, we tend to think of societal change in terms of ,stages', in which one
type of society is supplanted by another, and so forth. But the emergence of class-
divided societies, for example, did not eüminate tribal societies from the world.
Industrial capitalism has existed, and stül exists, in conjunction with various other
types of society (including, now sociaüsm) however strong and apparently implac-
able its tendency to corrode or to absorb them. Time-space edges refer to the forms
of contact — and offen of interdependency — betwen different structural types of
society. These are the edges of potential or actual social transformation, the (offen
unstable) intersections between different planes of societal Organisation.
The implications of all this, I beheve, are far-reaching. They speU the death-knell
of the sorts of dichotomous conceptions of societal development so populär in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: between Gemeinschaft and Gesell¬
schaft, mechanical and organic solidarity, etc. — insofar as these are offered as
overall frameworks for understanding institutional history. They also mean breaking
with what I would call .unfolding' modeis of social change. By .unfolding modeis'
I mean those conceptions which regard a society as an isolated unit, and as con-
taining within itself the mechanisms which bring about its transformation. Sociology
has beeh dominated by unfolding modeis, in Marxian as well as in other traditions.
In the work of Wallerstain, Emmanuel, Amin and others we see the beginnings of
an alternative view. But, thus far, their ideas have been focussed on the ,world
system' of modern capitalism. Recognition of the conceptual significance of time-
space edges impües also acknowledging the importance of what Wolfram Eberhard
calls ,world time'.14 That is to say, an episodic transition that occurs in one histori¬
cal conjuncture may have quite a different form, and quite different consequences,
to an apparently simüar episode in a different conjuncture. To appreciate the
importance of this is to appreciate the importance of taking seriously the proposi-
tion that sociology and history are one and the same. The choice is not one of
evolutionism on the one hand, or some kind of abstracted ,comparative sociology'
on the other; both of these have to be rejected.
I am sure I have come to the end of my allotted time for this lecture
— without
ever having reaUy arrived at the title I set myself, a discussion of time, let alone a
mention of Space. And yet I do think that everything I have said in this talk, if it
has any value, is only a prolegomenon. I have talked around the subject of time, but
I have not approached the mysterious but sociologically fundamental issue of the
conceptualisation of time — or, as I would rather put it, the conceptuahsation of
time-space relations. In such a conceptualisation, I beheve, reside some of the most
difficult but most pressing problems of social theory — ones that are vitalo what I
have earlier referred to as the theory of structuration. I think, with Parsons, that
the most elementary, and the most complex, problem of social theory is ,the
problem of order'. But he interpreted the problem of order in Hobbesian terms, as
how it comes about that the clash of egoisms can be reconcüed with the existence
of society. I hold that the problem of order is one of time-space — or, as the French
would say, of presences and absences. How is it that societies are organised across
time and across space? How is it that each individual's experience of the duree of
time is meshed with that of others who are distant in either time or space or both?
These, to me, are fundamental questions of social theory. I beheve I have some
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